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III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This matter was filed by Medical Recovery Services, LLC, ("MRS"), in magistrate court as a 
complaint for conversion, unjust enrichment and for a constructive trust against Bonneville Billing & 
Collections, Inc. ("BBC") for funds BBC received from Western States Equipment Company 
("WSEC") in the amount of $1,083.21. WSEC had mistakenly sent garnishment checks to BBC 
rather than to the Bonneville County Sheriff ("BCS") on a MRS garnishment of Stacy Christ 
("Christ"), and BBC had applied the funds to its own accounts against Christ. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
On September 18,2008, MRS filed a complaint in magistrate court against BBC. R. Vol. I, 
pp.9-14. Subsequently, over the next two and one-half years BBC prevailed on every motion for 
summary judgment and every motion for reconsideration before Magistrate Judge Linda 1. Cook and 
Magistrate Judge Stephen A. Gardner. Ultimately, BBC was granted judgment against MRS, the 
case was dismissed, and BBC was awarded its attorney fees and costs. R. Vol. I., pp. 85-87, 141-
143, 144-145; Vol. II., 163-168, 178-183. 
On May 3, 2011, MRS filed its appeal to the district court. R. Vol. II., pp. 184-186. On 
October 6, 2011, the district court reversed the magistrates' judgments in favor ofBBC. R. Vol. II., 
pp.241-255. BBC filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied on November 22, 2011. R. 
Vol. II., pp. 269-270. On November 17,2011, BBC appealed the matter to this court. R. Vol. II., pp. 
266-268. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 1 
C. Statement of Facts 
BBC, a collection company, received checks from WSEC written on a WSEC account 
payable to BBC on July 22, 2008, in the amount of $331.00, on July 28, 2008, in the amount of 
$394.83, and on August 12,2008, in the amount of$357.38 for a total of$I,083.21. BBC believed 
that the payments it received from WSEC's account were a voluntary wage assignment for accounts 
BBC was pursuing against Christ. Prior to receiving the WSEC checks payable to BBC, BBC knew 
that WSEC was the employer of Christ. On May 7, 2007, and on February 26,2008, BBC had been 
assigned accounts against Christ in the amountof$325.50 (account # 5413585), and on May 8, 2008, 
BBC had filed suit against Christ in Bonneville County Case No. CV 08-2669. On April 24, 2008, 
BBC had been assigned another account against Christ in the amount of $966.86 (account 
#5472394). On July 30, 2008, BBC had sent to Christ a demand letter for that account. R. Vol. I., 
pp.70-72. 
BBC applied $435.43 from the WSEC checks to account # 5413585, and on August 27, 
2008, BBC dismissed Case No. CV 08-2669 and zeroed out the $300.00 attorney fees sought in the 
complaint. BBC applied the remaining $647.78 from the WSEC checks to account #5472394. As 
there was still a balance owing from Christ, on October 9,2008, BBC filed suit against Christ in 
Bonneville County Case No. 08-6263, for account #5472394 for the remaining $552.22. On 
December 11, 2008, BBC obtained a judgment for $1,065.47. This judgment was subsequently 
satisfied by a continuing wage garnishment from Christ's wages from WSEC. R. Vol. I., pp. 70-72. 
On August 20,2008, Clayne Bodily ("Bodily"), BBC's manager, was contacted by WSEC 
which indicated to him that payments had mistakenly been sent to BBC for Christ but would now be 
sent to BCS. Bodily was informed that WSEC had inadvertently written checks to BBC rather than 
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to BCS on a continuing garnishment of Christ. R. Vol. 1., pp. 70-72, 55-56. (On June 4, 2008, 
MRS, a collection company, had obtained ajudgmentin the amountof$1,868.15 against Christ, and 
on June 12,2008, MRS had obtained a continuing garnishment against Christ's employer, WSEC. 
R. Vol. 1., pp. 39-50.) Bodily asked WSEC ifBBC could keep the WSEC funds for accounts owing 
by Christ since BBC had already applied the funds to Christ's accounts, and asked WSEC ifWSEC 
could simply continue the garnishment against Christ. When WSEC did not contact BBC with a 
response Bodily called WSEC and was informed by WSEC that they had been instructed by Bryan 
D. Smith ("Smith"), attorney for MRS, not to speak with BBC. Smith did not represent WSEC. 
BBC never refused any request by WSEC to return any money to WSEC because WSEC never 
requested BBC to return any money to WSEC. R. Vol. 1., pp. 70-72, 55-56. 
On August 21, 2008, MRS sent a demand letter to BBC demanding the return of the 
$1,083.21 BBC had received from WSEC. R. Vol. 1., pp. 66-67. On August 28, 2008, BBC 
responded in writing declining to return the WSEC funds as demanded by MRS. R. Vol. 1., p. 69. 
MRS then discontinued the continuing garnishment with WSEC against Christ, and, further, MRS 
instructed WSEC to stop payment on a check or to recall a check that had been sent to BCS from 
WSEC's continued garnishment of the wages of Christ. R. Vol. 1., pp. 73-75. From July 2008 
through at least April 2009 there was a continuing garnishment of Christ's wages at WSEC. Christ 
was employed at WSEC during this entire period. R. Vol. 1., pp.70-72. 
IV. ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Did the district court err by reversing the magistrate's judgment in favor ofBBC and granting 
MRS summary judgment on its claim for conversion? 
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2. Did the district court err by reversing the magistrate's judgment in favor ofBBC and granting 
MRS summary judgment on its claim for unjust enrichment? 
3. Did the district court err by reversing the magistrate's judgment in favor of BBC and 
imposing a constructive trust in favor of MRS? 
4. Did the district court err by vacating the magistrate's order regarding attorney's fees against 
MRS and ordering BBC to return the awarded attorney fees to MRS? 
5. Did the district court err by remanding the case for a determination of a reasonable, pre-
appeal fee award in favor of MRS and awarding MRS a reasonable award of attorney's fees on 
appeal? 
6. Should BBC be entitled to its attorney fees and costs in this appeal? 
V. ARGUMENT 
A. THE DISTRICT ERRED BY REVERSING THE MAGISTRATE'S JUDGMENT IN 
FAVOR OF BBC AND GRANTING MRS SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON ITS CLAIM 
FOR CONVERSION. 
1. The Idaho garnishment statutes control in determining whether MRS has any 
claim against BBC. 
MRS's claims in this matter arise from Idaho's garnishment statutes. The following 
unambiguous Idaho statutes deal with garnishments, providing a claim against the garnishee, but not 
against BBC: 
Debts and credits and other personal property not capable of manual delivery must be 
attached by leaving with the person owing such debts, or having in his possession or under 
his control such credits or other personal property, or with his agent, a copy of the writ, and a 
notice that the debts owing by him to the defendant, or the credits or other personal property 
in his possession or under his control, belonging to the defendants, are attached in pursuance 
of such writ. 
Idaho Code Section 8-506(5). 
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All persons having in their possession or under their control, any credits or other 
personal property belonging to the defendant, at the time of service upon them of a copy of 
the writ and notice, as provided in the last two (2) sections, shall be, unless such property be 
delivered up or transferred, or such debts be paid to the sheriff, liable to the plaintiff for the 
amount of such credits, property, or debts, until the attachment be discharged or any 
judgment recovered by him be satisfied. 
Idaho Code Section 8-508 (emphasis added). 
When the garnishee is the employer of the judgment debtor, the judgment creditor, 
upon application to the court, shall have issued by the clerk of court, a continuing 
garnishment directing the employer-garnishee to pay to the sheriff such future moneys 
coming due to the judgment debtor as may come due to said judgment debtor as a result of 
the judgment debtor's employment. This continuing garnishment shall continue in force and 
effect until the judgment is satisfied ..... 
Idaho Code Section 8-509(b)( emphasis added). 
Any person who has been served with a copy of the writ and notice as provided in 
sections 8-506--8-508, 11-201, 16-603, 16-604, or 16-1104, shall be deemed a garnishee, and 
service of copy of writ and the notice therein provided for, shall, for the purpose of sections 
8-510--8-523, be deemed to be notice of garnishment, and whenever any person shall have 
been served with notice of garnishment as herein defined, he may discharge himself by 
paying or delivering to the officer all debts owing by him to the defendant, or a portion 
thereof sufficient to discharge the claim of the plaintiff, or any or all money of the defendant 
in his hands to a similar amount, taking a receipt therefor from the officer, which shall 
discharge such person from any and all liability to the extent of such payment, and which 
shall be held by the officer subject to the orders of the court out of which the writ issued. 
Idaho Code Section 8-51 0 (emphasis added). 
If the garnishee admits in his answer that he is indebted to the defendant, or has 
money or property of the defendant in his hands, or under his control, and fails or refuses to 
turn the same over to the officer as in section 8-510 is provided, the plaintiff may move the 
court out of which the writ issued, on or before the return day thereof, for judgment against 
the garnishee for the amount of such admitted debt, or for the delivery to the officer of the 
money or property of the defendant in his hands, to an amount sufficient to satisfy the 
plaintiff s claim; serving the garnishee with due notice of the said motion; and at the hearing 
thereof the court shall render such judgment as shall be conformable to law and the facts 
shown to exist. 
Idaho Code Section 8-516 (emphasis added). 
When interpreting a statute, this Court must strive to give force and effect to the 
legislature'S intent in passing the statute. Davaz v. Priest River Glass Co., Inc., 125 Idaho 
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333, 336 (1994). It must begin with the literal words of the statute; those words must be 
given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning; and the statute must be construed as a whole. 
McLean v. Maverick Country Stores, Inc., 142 Idaho 810, 813 (2006). "Where the language of a 
statute is plain and unambiguous, this Court must give effect to the statute as written, without 
engaging in statutory construction." State v. Rhode, 133 Idaho 459, 462 (1999). "The Court 
interprets statutes according to their plain, express meaning, but will resort to judicial construction 
when the statute is "ambiguous, incomplete, absurd, or arguably in conflict with other laws. "" Ada 
County Highway Dist. v. Total Success Investments, LLC, 145 Idaho 360, 368 (Idaho 2008). "If the 
statutory language is unambiguous, we merely apply the statute as written." Sumpter v. Holland 
Realty, Inc., 140 Idaho 349, 351 (Idaho 2004). 
2. Pursuant to the garnishment statutes MRS has no property rights in WSEC 
checks written to BBC by the garnishee WSEC and not in the possession of 
WSEC. 
"The right of attachment by garnishment was unknown to the common law, and is purely of 
statutory regulation, and where the statute provides for the procedure in such cases, the plaintiff is 
only required to pursue such course in order to sustain his action against the garnishee." Eagleson v. 
Rubin, 16 Idaho 92, 100 (1909). "The remedy by attachment is entirely statutory, and the 
requirements ofthe statute must be substantially followed; otherwise, the attaching creditor acquires 
no superior right or lien upon the debtor's property." American Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Walmstad, 44 
Idaho 786, 792 (1927). Thus, no superior right or lien can be acquired if the statute is not followed. 
Eagleson provides the following regarding garnishees: 
Garnishment is the admonitionjudicially given to the attachment defendant's debtor 
or holder of property, warning him against payment or restoration to the defendant, and 
bidding him hold the property or credit subject to the order of court. It is the process by 
which the garnishee is brought into court, and also that by which the defendant's credit or 
property is attached in the garnishee's hands. Its service is constructive seizure by notice. It is 
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attachment in the hands of a third person. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
With reference to the execution of the writ of attachment C. S., sec. 6784, provides 
that personal property capable of manual delivery must be attached by taking it into custody. 
In case of tangible property, susceptible of manual seizure and delivery, such property must 
be actually seized and taken into possession by the levying officer, and that officer must take 
and maintain actual custody and control of the property by such means as will exclude others 
from such custody. 
Id. at 793. 
In re Loren v. Ducommun, 159 B.R. 919 (Bkrtcy. D. Idaho 1993), is a case which actually 
dealt with a wage garnishment, but the district court in this matter chose to simply disagree with it 
and disregard it. In re Loren provides the following: 
A garnishment is "the process by which the garnishee is brought into court, and also 
that by which the defendant's credit or property is attached in the garnishee'S hands. Its 
service is constructive seizure by notice. It is attachment in the hands of a third person." 
Eagleson v. Rubin, 16 Idaho 92, 100 P. 765, 767 (1909) (quoting Waples, Attachment and 
Garnishment, § 469). Inland is correct in its assertion that service of the writ of garnishment 
created a lien on the property held in the hands of the garnishee--here, the Sheriffs 
Department. " 'By the service in the manner provided by statute, whether it be termed 
'garnishment' or 'service of the attachment,' while the possession is not necessarily disturbed, 
'a lien is obtained on defendant's title to the property in the hands of the garnishee.' ' " 
Sullivan v. Mabey, 45 Idaho 595, 264 P. 233, 236 (1928) (quoting Kimball v. Richardson-
Kimball Co., 111 Cal. 386, 43 P. 1111 (1896)). "The plaintiff in the attachment action 
obtained a lien upon the pledged property in the hands of the pledgee bank by virtue of the 
garnishment proceedings." Fed. Res. Bank o/San Francisco v. Smith, 42 Idaho 224, 244 P. 
1102, 1103 (1926). See also Trustee, Ltd. v. Bowen-Hall, Inc. (In re Pro-Ida Foods, Inc.), 88 
I.B.C.R. 219, 221-22 (Bankr.D.Idaho 1988) (noting that garnishment creates a lien for the 
purpose of an avoidable preference action under 11 U.S.C. § 547). 
This does not mean that Inland is entitled to the relief which it seeks. Inland wishes, in 
effect, to foreclose its lien by garnishing Mr. Ducommun's wages. However, all of the Idaho 
authorities for the proposition that garnishment creates a lien limit that lien to property 
actually held by the garnishee. E.g., Sullivan, supra, 264 P. at 236 (" '[A] lien is obtained on 
defendant's title to the property in the hands of the garnishee' It) (emphasis added). Possession 
by the garnishee is, therefore, a necessary element for existence of the garnishment lien. 
This accords with other Idaho law. Garnishment is, as Eagleson noted, "attachment in 
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the hands of a third person." 100 P. at 767. In the case of American Fruit Growers, Inc. v. 
Walmstad, 44 Idaho 786,260 P. 168 (1927), a sheriff served a writ of attachment against 
certain property and issued a proper return, but apparently failed to take possession of the 
property as the return indicated. Because the attachment statute required the sheriff to take 
personal possession of the property, the Supreme Court of Idaho held that the attachment 
failed. 
. .... the lien thereof was absolutely lost when the [employer] or his keeper permitted 
appellant to take and retain possession of the property. Even the return of the [employer] 
does not purport to indicate that he continued in possession, and the evidence is entirely 
uncontradicted that at least from September 1 st to the date of sale this property was out of the 
control of the officer, and was in no sense in custodia legis. The lien of the attaching creditor, 
if any he ever had, was dependent upon the continuation of possession by the [employer]. 
The lien that [creditor] had by virtue of the garnishment was over a portion of those wages 
that [debtor] earned in May, 1993. Those funds are no longer in the possession of the 
[employer], the garnishee. There is, therefore, no lien against those funds. 
Id. at 920-921 (emphasis added). 
It is clear from the statutes and case law that the garnishee is to pay the sheriff. Continuation 
of possession is essential to any lien. In this matter the sheriff never obtained possession of the 
WSEC checks in question from WSEC. The garnishee, WSEC, made payments directly to BBC not 
to the sheriff. WSEC made payments on its own banking account to BBC. Pursuant to statute the 
MRS garnishment remained in force and effect until the judgment would have been satisfied. 
Pursuant to statute WSEC, as the garnishee, remained liable for the judgment. Pursuant to statute 
WSEC could discharge its liability by paying to the sheriff the amount of the debt. WSEC 
attempted to comply with the statute by continuing the garnishment, but MRS stopped the 
garnishment and directed that garnished funds be returned to WSEC. 
MRS has no rights in checks written to BBC by the garnishee, WSEC, on WSEC's own bank 
account. MRS has no lien in WSEC checks which are not in the possession of WSEC, but in the 
possession of BBC. MRS's claim, if any, is against WSEC as the garnishee. WSEC, as the 
garnishee, remains liable to MRS until the garnishment is satisfied pursuant to Idaho statute. This is 
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the plain meaning and intent of the garnishment statutes. 
BBC is not the real party in interest. WSEC is the real party in interest. The checks delivered 
to BBC by WSEC were written on WSEC's account to BBC. WSEC is the owner of the checks in 
question. It is irrelevant whether WSEC owed any money to BBC. MRS has no rights in checks 
written to BBC by WSEC on WSEC's own banking account. BBC negotiated the checks prior to 
demand by MRS for the return of the disputed funds. WSEC never demanded the return of the 
disputed funds from BBC. 
MRS's action is against WSEC as the garnishee which remains liable to MRS until the 
garnishment is satisfied pursuant to Idaho statute. BBC has never had in its possession any property 
of MRS. MRS's claims in this matter arise from Idaho's garnishment statutes. MRS's lien on 
Christ's wages arise from the garnishment statutes. "[T]here is no need for a equitable remedy when 
a legal remedy is available through the garnishment statutes." See Iron Eagle Development, L.L. C. v. 
Quality Design Systems, Inc., 138 Idaho 487, 491 (2003). 
It is clear that the Idaho garnishment statutes create the right to garnish and lien wages. 
Although these statutes create the lien upon Christ's wages, the district court did not apply those 
statutes to the instant case. This district court simply disagreed with In re Loren by quoting from 
Jaquith v. Stanger, 79 Idaho 49 (1957), a case involving an action for damages for trespass to the 
personal property of plaintiff. In Jaquith the court stated, in dicta, that "in attaching personal 
property capable of manual delivery, the officer must actually seize and hold the property to the 
exclusion of others, in order to create and maintain the lien of attachment." Id. At 54. The case did 
not depend upon the validity of the attachment proceedings against the debtor, or upon the validity of 
any purported attachment lien in favor of the creditor. Id Jaquith also provided that cases relied 
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upon by the district court "involved contests between the attaching creditor and other encumbrancers 
or claimants whose rights depend upon the validity or priority of the lien of the attachment. Such a 
question is not involved in this case." Id 
The district court incorrectly concluded that money was not "personal property" and was not 
capable of being manually delivered. Personal property is defined as "in a broad and general sense, 
everything that is the subject of ownership, not coming under denomination of real estate." Black's 
Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009). Hence, money is personal property. Money is capable of manual 
delivery, i.e. mailing a check. WSEC was to seize and hold the wages, personal property, to the 
exclusion of others and to forward it (normally by mailing a check) to the sheriff in order to create 
and maintain the lien of attachment. See Idaho Code Section 8-506(5). However, WSEC did not 
hold the personal property to the exclusion of others. WSEC did not forward a check to the sheriff. 
A lien is not maintained on checks forwarded to someone other than to the sheriff. 
When funds are no longer in the possession of the garnishee there is no lien against those 
funds. See In re Loren, 159 B.R. at 921. The lien is a possessory lien. "[T]he service of the writ of 
garnishment create[s] a lien on the property held in the hands of the garnishee." In re David & Laura 
Aughenbaugh, 2002 WL 33939738 (Bkrtcy. D. Idaho)(emphasis added). Idaho Code Section 8-
506(5) provides that attachment occurs by a writ for the credits or other personal property in his 
possession or under his control. Idaho Code Sections 8-508, 8-509(b), and 8-510 direct the garnishee 
to payor deliver to the sheriff or officer the wages as they come due. 
While MRS may have continued to have a lien upon the future wages of Christ, it had no 
right or lien on a check written on a WSEC account to BBC, delivered to BBC, and negotiated by 
BBC. The lien on Christ's future wages did not terminate until MRS unilaterally terminated it 
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because the garnishment was a continuing garnishment. 
The district court stated that the future earnings of Christ were not capable of manual delivery 
and could not be taken into custody. However, when those future earnings became present earnings 
and were, in fact, paid, then they were capable of being delivered to the sheriff. The funds were, 
therefore, capable of manual delivery to the sheriff. WSEC did not do this. WSEC delivered checks 
to BBC. Later, WSEC did manually deliver at least one check to BCS on the garnishment for which 
the lien continued, however, MRS refused to accept the check(s). 
Although the garnishment lien is preserved during the continuing garnishment, WSEC still 
needed to maintain possession of the funds collected in order to preserve the lien as to those funds. 
Then WSEC had to deliver those funds to the sheriff just as it did when it delivered checks to the 
sheriff which MRS subsequently refused to accept. If WSEC was no longer in possession of the 
checks and the sheriff was not in possession of the checks, then there is no possession, and, therefore 
there is no lien on those checks. 
Hypothetically, ifWSEC, instead of writing the checks to BBC, had mistakenly written the 
same checks for the same amounts to Bonneville County Implement ("BCI") which was owed money 
by WSEC, then would BCI have been liable to MRS for a conversion? Would BCI be ordered to 
return the disputed funds to WSEC? The answer would certainly be no. Or, ifthe money owed to 
BCI was disputed by WSEC, and WSEC had no intention of paying any amount to BCI would that 
somehow make any difference? Would BCI then have been liable to MRS for a conversion? It 
would appear that WSEC would have a claim against BCI over the disputed funds, and MRS would 
have no interest except against WSEC. In both examples, as in this case, the simple facts are that 
WSEC issued checks to a third party, WSEC did not maintain possession of the checks, and WSEC 
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did not deliver the checks to the sheriff. MRS can have no interest in a WSEC check written to any 
third party, except the sheriff pursuant to statute, and delivered to that third party. 
The district court also stated that MRS would be burdened by continuing the garnishment. 
How can there be a burden to MRS to continue a continuing garnishment? No further action at all is 
required by MRS to continue a continuing garnishment. By statute the garnishment continues on its 
own until the judgment is satisfied. 
3. BBC has not converted any property of MRS as MRS has no property or lien 
rights in this matter. 
Conversion is defined as "a distinct act of dominion wrongfully asserted over another's 
personal property in denial [of] or inconsistent with [the] rights therein." Torix v. Allred, 100 Idaho 
905, 910 (1980). "A complaint which alleges that plaintiff is the owner and entitled to the 
possession of property therein described and that defendant converted it to his own use, and which 
states the value of the property, or alleges that plaintiff has been damaged in a sum named, 
sufficiently states a cause of action for conversion, unless other averments are required by statute. 
See Williams v. Bone,74 Idaho 185, 187-88 (1953)." Id. 
The only rights MRS can have derive solely from the garnishment statutes. MRS has no lien 
right or property right because the garnishment statutes were not complied with and possession was 
not retained. The district court simply ignores this. 
Furthermore, BBC had valid, legal accounts assigned to it for which it was pursuing 
collection against Christ when WSEC sent WSEC checks to BBC. The amount of the accounts 
assigned to BBC exceeded the amount of the checks it received from WSEC. The checks were 
written on WSEC's account. WSEC never requested the funds be returned. BBC simply has never 
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had in its possession any property of MRS. BBC acted reasonably and in good faith in retaining the 
checks ofWSEC and applying them to the accounts of Christ, especially when WSEC, the owner of 
the checks, never requested their return. BBC had no duty to inquire as to the WSEC checks. BBC 
had no notice of any UCC filing creating any priority or lien. No lien has attached to WSEC checks 
written to BBC. There is simply no conversion of MRS property by BBC. 
4. MRS has failed to mitigate its "damages." 
"[T]he duty to mitigate, also known as the "doctrine of avoidable consequences," provides 
that a plaintiff who is injured by actionable conduct of a defendant is ordinarily denied recovery for 
damages which could have been avoided by reasonable acts, including reasonable expenditures, after 
actionable conduct has taken place. See Margaret H Wayne Trust v. Lipsky, 123 Idaho 253, 261 
(1993)." Peasley Transfer & Storage Co. v. Smith, 132 Idaho 732, 743 (1999). 
There was a continuing garnishment of Christ's wages from at least July 2008 through at 
least April 2009 and Christ continued to be employed at WSEC during that entire time. MRS 
discontinued the garnishment against Christ and, in fact, instructed WSEC to stop payment on a 
check or to recall a check from the BCS for which WSEC had continued to garnish the wages of 
Christ. WSEC was obligated to continue the garnishment and was continuing the garnishment until 
instructed by MRS to discontinue it. If MRS had continued its continuing garnishment rather than 
discontinuing it in order to pursue this litigation, then MRS would have received the equivalent 
amount that BBC received from WSEC by October 2008 and this matter would be moot. BBC's 
retention ofWSEC checks written to it by WSEC would have only prolonged MRS's garnishment by 
three pay periods or approximately one and one-half months. MRS would have suffered no damage 
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because it would have received within six weeks the amount MRS sought as damages in its 
complaint in the amount of the three checks. 
Continuing the garnishment would have been a reasonable act for MRS to take, in fact, it 
would have required no action at all from MRS. MRS would not have incurred any expenditure at 
all by continuing the garnishment. 
MRS had a duty to mitigate its "damages" by continuing the garnishment against Christ with 
WSEC. However, MRS chose to discontinue the garnishment and told WSEC to stop payment on a 
check or to recall a check from the BCS which would have gone toward the judgment obtained by 
MRS against Christ. Additionally, MRS directed WSEC not to speak to BBC, and, as a result, 
WSEC never requested the return of the funds. 
One might wonder why MRS did not mitigate its "damages" by accepting the next three 
garnishment checks from WSEC rather than stopping the garnishment. MRS had the ability to make 
itself whole but failed to do so. MRS has failed to mitigate its damages and is not entitled to any 
relief from the court. 
B. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY REVERSING THE MAGISTRATE'S 
JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF BBC AND GRANTING MRS SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
ON ITS CLAIM FOR UNJUST ENRICHMENT. 
A prima facie case of unjust emichment consists of three elements: (1) there was a benefit 
conferred upon the defendant by the plaintiff; (2) appreciation by the Defendant of such benefit; and 
(3) acceptance of the benefit under circumstances that would be inequitable for the defendant to 
retain the benefit without payment to the plaintiff for the value thereof. Vanderford Co., Inc. v. 
Knudson, 144 Idaho 547, 558 (2007)(emphasis added). Unjust emichment is an equitable claim and 
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"[ e ]quitable claims will not be considered when an adequate legal remedy is available." Iron Eagle 
Development, L.L.C, 138 Idaho at 492. 
In this matter MRS did not confer any benefit upon BBC. MRS argues that since it garnished 
Christ's wages that that act of garnishment conferred a benefit upon BBC. In reversing the 
magistrate court the district court determined that because MRS had garnished Christ's wages that 
that conferred a benefit upon BBC. The court stated that "BBC would not have received the funds 
absent MRS's efforts" and that "absent the writ procured by MRS" the funds would have been sent 
to Christ instead. IfWSEC had complied with the garnishment statutes the checks would have been 
sent to the sheriff, and BBC would not have received anything. WSEC "failed" to deliver the funds 
to the sheriff. Idaho Code Section 8-516. The only benefit conferred upon BBC was conferred by 
WSEC alone. WSEC wrote the checks to BBC. MRS did not direct WSEC to write the checks to 
BBC. There simply was no benefit conferred upon BBC by MRS. 
Using the district court's own logic one would have to conclude that the medical provider 
who turned over the account to MRS also conferred a benefit upon BBC: for if the medical provider 
had not turned over the account then MRS would not have garnished Christ, and then WSEC would 
not have sent WSEC checks to BBC. Using the district court's logic then one would also have to 
conclude that Christ himself conferred a benefit upon BBC: for since Christ did not pay the medical 
account it had to be turned over to MRS, who garnished Christ's account, and then WSEC sent 
WSEC checks to BBC. Using the district court's flawed logic the medical provider and Christ 
would both be entitled to a claim for unjust enrichment against BBC. It is simply illogical to 
conclude that MRS conferred any benefit upon BBC. The only benefit conferred upon BBC was by 
WSEC and no one else. 
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In the classic, law school, unjust enrichment example A contracts with B to paint B's house, 
but instead A mistakenly paints C's house. A has conferred a benefit upon C: A painted C's house. 
A is the only one who has conferred any benefit upon C and can make a claim for unjust enrichment 
against C. D, who referred B to A, cannot claim that he has conferred a benefit upon C by arguing 
that ifD had not made the referral to B then C's house would not have been painted by A. Nor canE, 
the mailman, who mistakenly told A that C's house was B's house, claim that he conferred a benefit 
upon C by arguing that if E had not pointed out the wrong house then A would not have painted C' s 
house. The only one who conferred a benefit upon C is A: A painted C's house. 
In this matter the only one who conferred any benefit upon BBC was WSEC: WSEC wrote 
the checks on WSEC's account to BBC. 
The district court incorrectly concluded that the benefit, the checks, conferred by MRS to 
BBC were the property of MRS. The only interest MRS had in the checks derived from the 
garnishment statutes. Possession was not maintained and any right MRS had was lost as to those 
WSEC checks. MRS had no property or lien interest in the checks, and thus no benefit to confer. 
It is not inequitable for BBC to have accepted the benefit from WSEC as BBC had accounts 
for which Christ owed, and as WSEC did not make a demand for the return of the disputed funds. It 
is not inequitable for BBC to retain the checks received from WSEC as MRS would have still 
received payment from WSEC under the continuing garnishment which would have satisfied the 
judgment. MRS could have taken no action at all and received the continuing garnishment 
payments. However, rather than continuing to accept checks from the sheriff MRS voluntarily 
discontinued the continuing garnishment which would have satisfied MRS's judgment against 
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Christ, and instructed WSEC to stop payment on a check or recalled a check from the Bonneville 
County Sheriff from WSEC which had continued to garnish the wages of Christ. 
MRS has an adequate legal remedy against WSEC, the real party in interest, pursuant to 
Idaho garnishment statutes, and MRS has not mitigated its "damages." MRS had no benefit to 
confer on BBC. WSEC conferred the benefit. BBC simply has not been unjustly enriched by MRS. 
C. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY REVERSING THE MAGISTRATE'S 
JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF BBC AND IMPOSING A CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST IN 
FAVOR OF MRS. 
A constructive trust is a "remedial device created primarily to prevent unjust enrichment ... " 
Chinchurreta v. Evergreen Management, Inc., 117 Idaho 591, 593 (Ct. App. 1989). Since MRS had 
no benefit to confer and did not confer any benefit upon BBC, there can be no unjust enrichment. 
Thus there can be no constructive trust. There is no need for an equitable remedy when a legal 
remedy is available through the garnishment statutes. See Iron Eagle Development, L.L.C, 138 
Idaho at 492. Furthermore, MRS has failed to mitigate its "damages." 
D. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY VACATING THE MAGISTRATE'S ORDER 
REGARDING ATTORNEY'S FEES AGAINST MRS AND ORDERING BBC TO 
RETURN THE AWARDED ATTORNEY FEES TO MRS. 
As the prevailing party at the magistrate level under five separate orders all finding for BBC 
and against MRS, and issued by two different magistrate judges, BBC was entitled to an award of 
attorneys fees and costs under Idaho Code Section 12-120(1). Furthermore, MRS failed to timely 
object to the amount of the award of attorney fees and costs to BBC. In granting this appeal, BBC is 
the prevailing party and is entitled to its attorney fees and costs. 
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E. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY REMANDING THE CASE FOR A 
DETERMINATION OF A REASONABLE, PRE-APPEAL FEE AWARD IN FAVOR 
OF MRS AND AWARDING MRS A REASONABLE AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S 
FEES ON APPEAL. 
As MRS is not the prevailing party, MRS is not entitled to any award of attorney fees and 
costs. Idaho Code Section 12-120(1). 
F. BBC IS ENTITLED TO RECOVER ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS ON APPEAL. 
As the prevailing party on appeal, BBC is entitled to an award of attorneys fees and costs 
pursuant to Rule 35, 40 and 41 of the Idaho Appellate Rules and Idaho Code Section 12-120(1). 
Accordingly, BBC requests that the court award it its attorney fees and costs in this matter. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Based upon the record before the Court, the statutes, cited case law precedent, and the 
arguments presented, BBC respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's October 6, 
2011, Memorandum Decision Re: Appeal. BBC has converted no property of MRS. BBC has not 
been unjustly emiched by MRS. A constructive trust should not be imposed. MRS has failed to 
mitigate its "damages." MRS does not have a claim against BBC upon which relief can be granted. 
MRS has suffered no damages. MRS is not the real party in interest. MRS's cause of action, if any, 
is against the garnishee, WSEC. BBC should be entitled to its attorney fees below and on this 
appeal, and MRS should not be entitled to any attorney fees. 
DATED this 25th day of April, 2012. 
~----..:::.:, 
Todd R. Erikson 
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PO Box 50731 
~~---~------~ Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 19 
